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    Are poor people more or less likely to take money risks than wealthy folks? We find that 
risk attraction is more prevalent among the wealthy when the amounts of money at risk are small 
(not surprising, since ten dollars is a smaller amount for a wealthy person than for a poor one), but, 
interestingly, for the larger amounts of money at risk the fraction of the nonwealthy displaying risk 
attraction exceeds that of the wealthy.  
We also replicate our previous finding that many people display risk attraction for small 
money amounts, but risk aversion for large ones. We argue that preferences yielding “risk 
attraction for small money amounts, together with risk aversion for larger amounts, at all levels of 
wealth,” while contradicting the expected utility hypothesis, may be well-defined, independently 
of reference points, on the choice space.  
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1.  Introduction 
Are poor people more or less likely to take pure money risks than wealthy folks? We 
experimentally address the dependence of risk attitudes (risk aversion or attraction) on wealth by 
conducting the same experiment on two groups of subjects, the Nonwealthy and the Wealthy.  
  Because we are interested in the dependence on wealth of risk attitude, rather that the 
degree of risk aversion, our subjects are required to choose between alternatives with the same 
expected money value: all risk averse individuals will then choose the safe alternative, no matter 
what their degree of risk aversion is.
2 Thus, our experiments do not directly address the related, 
and often-studied, issue of the dependence of absolute or relative risk aversion on wealth.
3  
    Subjects were told that they would be randomly assigned, without replacement, to one of 
seven prizes. But they had a 20% chance of losing the prize, and could buy an actuarially fair 
insurance against this loss. Subjects were asked to decide, before knowing to which group they 
would belong, whether for each of the seven possible prizes to insure or not to insure it. If the 
subject chose not to insure a given prize, then we say that he or she displayed risk attraction for the 
money amount of the prize, or that she risked that amount. If, on the contrary, she chose to insure, 
then we say that he or she displayed risk aversion for that money amount. 
  In a nutshell, we found that risk attraction was more prevalent among the Wealthy when the 
amounts of money at risk were small but, for the larger amounts of money at risk, we found that 
the fraction of the Nonwealthy displaying risk attraction exceeded that of the Wealthy.  
                                                 
1 Thanks are due to Albert Satorra who performed the statistical analysis. We also thank Antonio Cabrales, Gary 
Charness and Mark Machina for helpful comments, and Elena Jarocinska for assisting with the experiments. 
2 We will discuss risk neutrality when analyzing the experimental data. 
3 The large literature on this issue starts with the pioneering work of Kenneth Arrow (1965, 1970) and John Pratt (1964)   3
  Replicating the feature evidenced in Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre (1999, 2003), we also 
find that a large majority of subjects display what we call the standard pattern: whenever risk 
attraction is displayed in a choice involving a given amount of money, risk attraction is also 
displayed for any smaller amount of money. We can then define a subject’s highest risked amount 
(HRA) as highest money amount that she or he fails to insure (we set at zero the HRA of a subject 
who insures all amounts).  In our experiments, the bottom 86% of the Wealthy distribution have a 
higher HRA than the bottom 86% of the Nonwealthy distribution, indicating that risk attraction is 
more prevalent among Wealthy than among Nonwealthy. But the top 14% of the Nonwealthy 
distribution have a higher HRA than the top 14% of the Wealthy distribution, i.e., the very risk-
attracted Nonwealthy (relative to their fellow Nonwealthy) risk more that the very-risk attracted 
Wealthy.  
  Given our previous results showing that many people display risk attraction for small 
money amounts, but risk aversion for large ones, the finding that Wealthy are more likely to 
display risk attraction for small money amounts is not surprising: ten dollars represent a smaller 
amount for a wealthy person than for a poor one. But Nonwealthy’s higher likelihood of 
displaying risk attraction when the amounts of money at stake are large is noteworthy.  
Section 8 below discusses preferences yielding “risk attraction for small money amounts, 
together with risk aversion for larger amounts, at all levels of wealth” from the theoretical 
viewpoint. On the one hand, they do contradict expected utility theory, and, hence, they lie on the 
far side of the great divide between preferences that satisfy the expected utility hypothesis and 
those that do not. But, on the other hand, they are on the near side of a second great theoretical 
divide, namely between preferences that are well defined on the choice space, and reference-
dependent preferences, which require a different map of indifference curves for each reference 
point.   
 
2. The experiment 
We run the experiment with two groups of Catalan subjects, all in their last year of “batxillerat,” 
which is the university-bound track in high school. The two groups have the same age, identical 
formal education, same nationality, and involve similar proportions of males and females.
4
                                                 
4 According to Luigi Guiso and Monica Paiella (2001), p. 9, “risk averse are younger and less educated; they are less 
likely to be male…”  Empirical research on wealth and risk has to wrestle to separate the effects of different types of   4
The first group includes students of a public high school in a low-income neighborhood in 
Barcelona. The second group includes students attending a high-tuition private school in a plush 
area in the same city.  We will call these groups Nonwealthy and Wealthy, respectively.
5 In Spain, 
public schools are free and, in large cities, attract mostly students from the neighborhood. A public 
school in a low-income neighborhood is unlikely to receive any applications from students living 
in well-to-do neighborhoods. Therefore, by choosing participants among the students in these two 
schools we were reasonably certain to observe children from families with middle to low incomes 
in one place and children from high--income families in the other. A questionnaire about family 
and social background, which the participants in the experiment had to answer, reveals that this 
assumption appears to be correct. In Table 1 we report their answers to the question about their 
parents’ jobs, showing that the ratio of low-paid jobs over high-paid jobs is clearly higher among 
the Nonwealthy group.  
 
 
Parents’ jobs          Nonwealthy      Wealthy 
 
Housewife     18%     0% 
Blue  collar     18%     0% 
W h i t e   c o l l a r      5 1 %      2 1 %  
Professional       8%     43% 
Small  business  owner    15%     21% 
Business  executive    0%     14% 
 
Table 1. Distribution of parents’ jobs in the two groups of Nonwealthy and Wealthy 
subjects, in percentage of answers. (Out of 42 possible answers for each group, we received 39 from 
Nonwealthy and 28 from Wealthy). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
wealth, in particular, wealth measured in human capital and wealth measured in net assets, two types of wealth that 
often yield opposite effects on risk taking (see Martin Halek and Joseph Eisenhauer, 2001, p. 13 and 22). We have no 
such problem in our experiment, since we can safely assume that participants have similar amounts of human capital. 
5 Because family wealth is independent from the behavior of our young subjects, our method avoids possible problems 
of interdependence between risk attitudes and wealth.   5
  While from the answers to the questionnaire we cannot ascertain the degree of wealth 
dispersion within the two groups, it appears unlikely that the highest levels of wealth in the 
Nonwealthy group could be above the lowest in the Wealthy group. We therefore confidently 
assume that Wealthy and Nonwealthy are two groups clearly separated by their wealth levels. 
Needless to say, characteristics other than wealth differences can be a factor in the experimental 
results. 
6 Yet, the experimental subjects share those characteristics that are usually singled out as 
influencing risk attitudes, like religion, race, employment or marriage, in addition to age and 
education. 
  We performed the experiment with each group in a single session (no preliminary pilot 
sessions) using 21 subjects per group that were chosen randomly among the male and female 
volunteers. We tried to maintain a similar proportion of sexes in both experiments (the 
female/male ratio was 10/11 in Wealthy and 9/12 in Nonwealthy). Subjects were told that they 
would be randomly assigned, without replacement, to one of seven prizes. Prizes were 
denominated in the (former) Spanish currency, pesetas: 500, 1000, 2000, 5000, 7500, 10000 or 
15000 (i.e., approximately, in PPP, from US$ 5.00 to US$ 150).
7 But subjects had a 20% chance 
of losing the prize, and could buy an actuarially fair insurance against this loss.
8 Subjects were 
                                                 
6 We know from the responses to our questionnaire that 51% of parents’ jobs among Nonwealthy are “white collar,” 
while only 20% are of this type among Wealthy. Could it be that white collars, who tend to receive their salary on a 
regular basis, are less risk-takers than business executives and business owners? And, if so, could it be that children in 
these families have been socialized to become less risk-takers? Or, on the contrary, is it the case that professionals 
(many of whom, in Spain, could be civil servants with secure jobs) are less risk-taking and, representing 43% of 
Wealthy parents but only 8% of Non-Wealthy parents, have socialized a larger proportion of Wealthy respondents to 
being less risk-taking? Since the questionnaire was answered anonymously, we cannot associate observed behavior to 
parents jobs and, consequently, we cannot even try to answer these questions
 
7 15,000 pesetas is a large amount of money for Catalan high school students. In the questionnaire mentioned above, 
we also asked participants to compare this amount of money with their monthly income. For Nonwealthy it 
represented an average of 175% (16 answers out of 21), while for Wealthy the average was lower and equal to 113% 
(12 answers out of 21). 
 
8 We avoided extreme probabilities: 0.2 seems to be above the range that tends to be overweighted (Malcolm Preston 
and Philip Baratta, 1948) and below the range that tends to be underweighted (0.3 to 0.8 according to Michele Cohen, 
Jean-Yves Jaffray and Tanios Said, 1985). Also, one observes  in Steven Kachelmeier and  Mohamed Shehata (1992) 
that, at a 80% probability of winning, subjects tend to be risk neutral, which is not the case for lower probabilities. One 
could be more confident, then, that the choice of a probability of winning of 80% may not bias, by itself, the degree of 
risk aversion. But Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahnemann (1992) suggest that there is overweighting at 0.2 and 
underweighting at 0.8 (Figure 3.3), whereas the earlier Figure 2.4 in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggests no 
overweighting at 0.2. At the other extreme, William Harbaugh, Kate Krause and Lise Vesterlund (2002) claim to 
observe overweighting at 0.8. 
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asked to decide, before knowing to which group they would belong, whether for each of the seven 
possible prizes to insure or not to insure it.  
  To record their decisions, as in other similar experiments that we have run (Bosch-
Domènech and Silvestre 1999, 2003), subjects were given a 7-page folder, one page for each 
possible prize. Every page had five boxes arranged vertically. The prize was printed in the first 
box and the insurance premium in the second one, with the statement that the premium was 
exactly 20% of the prize. The third box contained two check cells, one for insuring the prize, and 
another one for not insuring it. Below a separating horizontal line, two more boxes were later used 
to record first whether the prize was lost and, second, the take-home amount. In order to facilitate 
decisions, a matrix on the back of the page showed all the payoffs. The information was given to 
the subjects as written instructions (available on request), which were read aloud by the 
experimenter. The experiment began after all questions were privately answered. 
  Once all subjects had registered their decisions (under no time constraint: nobody used 
more than 15 minutes), their pages were collected. Subjects were then called one by one to an 
office with an urn that initially contained 21 pieces of paper: each piece indicated one prize, and 
each of the seven prizes occurred three times. A piece of paper was randomly drawn: the 
experimenter and the subject then checked in the folder whether the subject had insured that 
particular prize. If he or she had, then the premium was subtracted from the prize to obtain the 
take-home amount. If he or she had not, then a number from 1 to 5 was randomly chosen from 
another urn. If the number 1 was drawn, then the subject would lose the prize, taking nothing 
home. Otherwise, he or she would take home the prize. The subject was then paid and dismissed, 
and the next subject was escorted into the office. 
  The following element of the experiment was not included in the written instructions. As 
described above, we asked subjects to consider all seven possible prizes with the intention of 
obtaining a larger data set. This procedure tends to elicit the same choices as when subjects make 
only one choice (Chris Starmer and Robert Sugden, 1991), but we wanted to check this tendency. 
Consequently, we allowed each subject to reconsider her reported decision after her prize was 
selected. Of the 42 subjects involved, only one, labelled JN, changed his mind (from non-
insurance to insurance). This observation seems insufficient to negate the overall reliability of 
hypothetical decisions as accurate descriptions of real choices, but it does exemplify a higher 
likelihood of risk aversion in played games (Robin Hogarth and Hillel Einhorn, 1990).   7
  The experimental data are presented in tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix. 
 
3. Stylized facts 
From the results in Tables A1 and A2, we can construct Table 2, which supports the following 
result: 
Result 1. On average, Wealthy subjects are more likely to risk (decline to insure) small money 
amounts, whereas Nonwealthy subjects are more likely to risk large money amounts.
9  
 
 In  particular: 
 
• For any amount lower than or equal to 5000, the number of Wealthy subjects who risk that 
amount exceeds that of Nonwealthy subjects. 
• And for any amount larger than 5000, the number of Nonwealthy subjects who risk that 
amount exceeds that of wealthy subjects.  
 
  A preliminary conclusion would be, therefore, that wealthy subjects are more likely to 
display risk aversion than less wealthy subjects for large enough amounts of money at stake, but 




                                                 
9 Note the contrast with the empirical data reported by Luigi Guiso and Monica Paiella (2001) on p. 9, “…the risk-
averse are significantly less wealthy than the risk lovers or neutrals.” But notice that the authors characterize each 
individual by one single measure of risk aversion, while we observe that individuals may have different attitudes 
towards risk depending on the income at risk. Also, their statement should be qualified by their own conclusion, p. 31, 
that there is limited empirical evidence on the sign of the relationship between risk attitude and wealth. But see Bas 
Donkers, Bertrand Melenberg and Arthur Van Hoest (2001) p. 182, who observe that risk aversion appears to decrease 
with income using data from a questionnaire on hypothetical risks.   
 
10 A risk-neutral subject could choose either the certain or the uncertain prospect, his choice being random. But the 
likelihood that our samples consist of random variation is statistically undistinguishable from zero. 
 
11 While our experimental data show women being less risk averse than men for very small amounts (500-1000) and 
more risk averse for larger amounts, this effect is dominated by the effect of wealth.   8
 
 




1000  2000 5000 7500  10000  15000 
Number of Nonwealthy Subjects  




7  3 4 5  2 4 
Fraction of Nonwealthy Subjects  




0.33  0.14 0.19 0.24  0.10 0.19 
Number of Wealthy Subjects  




11  6 5 1  1 2 
Fraction of Wealthy Subjects  
Who Risk the Amount 
 
0.86 0.52  0.29 0.24 0.05      0.05 0.10   
 
Table 2. Number and fraction of subjects in the Wealthy and Nonwealthy groups that risk 
the various money prizes. 
 
  We say that an individual follows the standard pattern if, whenever she displays risk 
attraction in a choice involving a given amount of money, she also displays risk attraction for any 
smaller amount of money. The inspection of Tables A.1 and A.2 yields the following result. 
 
Result 2. A large proportion of subjects (18/21= 86%) follow the standard pattern in either group. 
 
4. The distribution of the degree of risk attraction 
Within the standard pattern, we can rank a subject’s risk attraction by the highest amount that she 
or he fails to insure: we call it highest risked amount, or HRA. We set at zero the HRA of a subject 
who insures all amounts. 
If we disregard the subjects who violate the standard pattern, then our experimental 
observations, complemented by linear interpolation, generate a distribution of HRA for each of the 
two groups. Figure 1 shows the corresponding CDF’s, and Table 3 gives some of the statistics.  
 
 





= Lowest Risk Attraction 










17% lowest HRA 
(Bottom 17%) 
0  0 
25% 
(Bottom quartile) 
0  125 
44% 
(Bottom 44%) 
0  417 
50% 
(Median) 
125  500 
75% 
(Top quartile) 










5500  3800 
95% 
(Top 5%) 
8250  5500 
98% 
(Top 2%) 
12300  8200 
Table 3. Percentile distribution of the highest amount of money that subjects risked (with linear 
interpolation) in Nonwealthy and Wealthy groups. Higher HRA’s per percentile group appear in 
bold. 
   
 We  observe  that 
•  The bottom 17% of the Wealthy distribution, and the bottom 44 % of the Nonwealthy 
distribution, insure all risks. 
•  The bottom 86% of the Wealthy distribution have a (weakly) higher HRA than the bottom 
86% of the Nonwealthy distribution. 
•  But the top 14% of the Nonwealthy distribution have a higher HRA than the top 14% of 
the Wealthy distribution, i.e., the very risk-attracted Nonwealthy (relative to their fellow 
Nonwealthy) risk more that the very-risk attracted Wealthy.  
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5.  Individual behavior at different wealth levels 
We ask the hypothetical question: if a Nonwealthy subject were wealthy, what would be her 
HRA? Assume that the distribution of HRA in either wealth category is invariant. Assume 
moreover than, when moving across wealth categories, a subject’s position in the distribution of 
the HRA does not change, i.e., a subject who has the median HRA when non-wealthy also has the 
median HRA when wealthy. Similarly, a subject who, when non-wealthy, has a HRA in the 75% 
percentile of the distribution of non-wealthy HRA also is in the 75% percentile of the wealthy 
HRA when wealthy, and so on. Under these assumptions, we can use Figure 1 and Table 3 to 





Type Percentage  Description 
I  17%  Avoids all risks at all wealth levels 
 
 
II  25%  Avoids all risks when nonwealthy; 
Takes very small risk when wealthy 
 
III  44%  Takes a medium risk when nonwealthy; 
Takes larger, but not very large, risk when wealthy 
 
IV  14%  Takes a relatively large risk when nonwealthy; 
Takes a lower risk when wealthy 
 
Table 4 




Type I behaviour is consistent with preferences on money lotteries that satisfy the expected 
utility hypothesis and display risk aversion: i.e., they can be represented via a strictly concave von   11
Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility function defined on (a subset of) the real line. But Types II-
IV violate the canonical expected utility model to the extent that they take small risks, but not 
large ones, for a wide interval of wealth. Nevertheless, their preferences may be independent from 
a reference point, and, in this sense, all types may have well-defined, consistent preferences over 
the space of uncertain prospects. Section 8 below explains.  
A Type III decision maker is willing to take small risks, but not large ones, at all levels of 
wealth, “small” being understood relative to her wealth. The interesting Type IV reverses Type 
III: the decision maker is willing to take larger risks when Nonwealthy than when Wealthy. It 
includes the extreme case of taking all risks when Nonwealthy, as one of our Nonwealthy subjects 
did.  
Types III and IV (with the exception of the extreme case) share the feature: at all levels of 
wealth, the decision maker is willing to take small risks, but not very large ones. Our experimental 
results (including the ones reported here, the ones in Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre (1999, 2002) 
and various classroom experiments) have convinced us that this is a highly realistic feature, well 
represented in real-life populations.  
 
6. Statistical model 
To tighten up the previous observations, we consider the probit regression model with random 








 =  α + ui + bzj , 
i ∈ {1,…I},where I is the number of subjects. 
j ∈{1, …, 7}, the seven levels of money 
zj ∈{0.5, 1, 2, 5, 7.5, 10, 15}. 
 
 
The variable pij is the probability that subject i chooses the certain alternative (and thus displays 
risk aversion) when the amount of money at stake is zj (or -zj) in thousands of pesetas (so as to 
avoid too many decimals in the estimates of the regression coefficients). The individual effect ui   12
allows for heterogeneous individual tastes assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero 
and standard deviation σ, so that (α + ui) is the random intercept.
12   
The results of the maximum likelihood estimation of this equation for the Nonwealthy and 
Wealthy groups, estimated separately (147 observations in each estimation)
13, are reported in 





       v |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       z |   .1390     .0564     2.465   0.014       .02846    .2496 
constant |    1.0490   .6059      1.731   0.083      -.1385    2.2365 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ln  σ
2   |    1.2996   .5604      2.319   0.020       .2012    2.3980 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        σ|   1.915216   .5366                          1.1058    3.3168 
                   ρ|   .7857779   .0943                         .5501     .9166 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 






       v |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t    P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       z |   .45028   .0988      4.555   0.000       .2564    .64392 
constant |  -.7903    .5248     -1.506   0.132      -1.8190    .2384 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ln σ
2    |   .9916    .6110      1.623   0.105      -.2058    2.1892 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        σ|    1.6418  .5016                          .9021    2.9880 
        ρ|   .7294    .12058                         .4487     .8992 
 
 
Table 6. Results of the ML estimation with the Wealthy data. 
 
 
  If, for each group, we plot the probability of insuring with respect to the prizes (divided by 
1000), we obtain Figure 2. 
 
[Fig 2] 
                                                 
12 We adopt the same statistical model as in Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre (1999, 2003).  
13 We did an estimation of the joint data (294 observations) including a dummy group-variable. The joint estimation 
uses more data but forces a common intercept and slope. The estimation was not significant for some variables. The 
discussion below will help to understand why.   13
  Notice first that all estimates are significant.  Second, the graph seems to indicate that the 
two curves describe different behaviour. To verify that the intercepts are statistically different, we 
computed a t-test of the equality of the two groups’ intercepts (we used the fact that the two 
samples are independent) obtaining t = 2.73, a value that rejects the null hypothesis of equality of 
intercepts (p-value = 0.006 for a two-sided test). 
On the basis of the estimated regression model for each group, we want now to verify that 
our assumption of heterogeneity of individual decisions is appropriate. For this we run a χ
2 test of 
the null hypothesis ρ = 0. The hypothesis indicates that there is no intraclass correlation of the 
individual decisions. But the test rejects the hypothesis for both groups with a p-value close to 0. 
Therefore, the individual effect is highly significant, as previous empirical analysis of risk had 
noticed, and can be confirmed by looking at the 95% confidence interval of σ. 
Finally, since exp (0.139) = 1.149, the statistical analysis also allows us to say that, for the 
Nonwealthy, the odds of insuring increase by 15% when the money prize increases by 1000 
pesetas. Note also that for the Nonwealthy, the probability of insuring is high when the amount of 
money at risk is zero, namely, exp (1.049)/(1+ exp (1.049)) = 0.74, or 74%. For Wealthy, the odds 
of insuring increase by as much as 57% when the prize increases by 1000 pesetas, but the 
probability of insuring a prize equal to zero is lower than for Nonwealthy and equal to 31%. 
The statistical analysis confirms the previous observation that Nonwealthy insure small 
incomes at risk more than Wealthy.
14 The probability of insuring high amounts is close to one for 
both the Nonwealthy and the Wealthy, with the Wealthy insuring somewhat more frequently than 
the Nonwealthy. This analysis supports the preliminary conclusions stated as Result 1 in Section 3 
above. 
 
7. Risk attitudes and the amount of money at risk 
We showed in Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre (1999) that experimental subjects become more 
likely to display risk aversion as the amount of the money at risk increases. All the results of the 
experiments reported here confirm that the probability of insuring increases with the amount of 
money at risk. 
                                                 
14 Of course, we cannot rule out that the monetary rewards were too low for the Wealthy people to completely 
dominate nonmonetary influences.   14
  In particular, if we add together the data from Wealthy and Nonwealthy (294 observations) 
and we run the same regression model as above with zj as the independent variable and log of the 
odds as the dependent variable, we obtain the results in Table 7. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       v |   Coef.   Std. Err.    t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      z  |   .2645   .0482      5.485   0.000       .1700    .3591 
constant |   .1416   .3648      0.388   0.698      -.5735    .8567 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ln σ
2    | 1.059611  .4158505  2.548   0.011       .2445586    1.874663 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       σ |   1.6986   .3531                         1.1300    2.5531 
       ρ |   .74261   .0794                          .5608   .8669 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Table 7. Results of the joint ML estimation with the Nonwealthy and Wealthy data. 
 
 
  Observe that there is a significant effect of the independent variable on the probability of 
insuring. Moreover, as shown in the previous estimations, there is an individual variation on the 
propensity to insure. This is captured by a random individual effect which is also significant (the 
hypothesis that individual correlation is zero being rejected by a chi-square test with p-value = 
0.0000). More important, since exp(0.2646) is equal to 1.303, we can report that the odds of 
insuring increase by 30% for increases of 1000 pesetas in the amount of money at risk. Note also 
that the overall probability of insuring is high for very small amounts of money  
(1/(1 + exp(-0.142 )) = 0.535,  i.e. approximately 53%)   
  The regression clearly supports Result 2 in Section 3 above. This result, also observed in 
Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre (1999, 2003), agrees with the empirical evidence reported by Roel 
Beetsma and Peter Schotman (2001) who claim, p. 847, that “the required minimum probability of 
winning in a lottery […] rises from a 53% for a stake of f1,000 to 73% for a stake of f8,000”. In 
other words, as the income at risk increases, so increases the degree of risk aversion. Similar 
results have been observed by Holt and Laury (2002). Strangely, Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) 
observe that at an 80% probability of winning, the average risks attitudes are similar (risk 
neutrality in both cases) for two groups that risk incomes that are different by a factor of ten. In 
our experiments, the difference from the lowest to the largest income was a factor of thirty, and 
the slope of the estimated function of probability of insuring with respect to income was never flat. 
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8. Implications for preference theory 
A subject in our experiments, with initial wealth w, has to choose between the risky prospect of a 
money gain of z with known probability p and the certain money gain of pz.
 Clearly, the risky 
prospect induces the contingent final money balances (x1, x2) = (w,  w + z),  whereas the certain 
gain induces (x1, x2) = (w + pz,  w + pz) 
  The person’s choice displays risk attraction (resp. aversion) if she chooses the risky 
prospect (resp. the certain money gain pz). Our experiments have studied the dependence of risk 
attitudes on (i) the person’s initial wealth, and (ii) whether the amount at risk z is large or small. 
This section discusses the two phenomena from the viewpoint of preference theory.  
A person’s attitude is wealth-dependent if she prefers the risky prospect at some wealth 
level, but prefers its certain expected money value at a different level of wealth.
15 We say that a 
person’s risk attitude is amount-dependent if she displays risk attraction when the amounts at risk 
are small, but aversion for large ones, at all levels of wealth (or, at least, for a wide interval of 
wealth values).  
Wealth-dependent attitudes are in principle compatible with the canonical expected utility 
model, witness Milton Friedman and Leonard Savage (1948). All it takes is a vNM utility function 
that is concave in part of its domain (that of wealth levels at which the person displays risk 
aversion for small risks), and convex in some other parts (attraction).
16  
On the other hand, amount-dependent attitudes would require, in the canonical expected 
utility model, the vNM utility function u to be locally convex everywhere, implying convexity on 
its domain, which would contradict the aversion to large risks.
17 Thus, amount-dependent attitudes 
are incompatible with the canonical expected utility model. In this sense, they reside in the far side 
                                                 
15 As noted in the introduction, the Arrow –Pratt literature considers a related issue within the canonical expected 
utility model: it assumes risk aversion and considers the acceptance or rejection of actuarially favourable risks of 
various sizes depending on the initial wealth: this leads to the discussion of increasing or decreasing absolute or 
relative risk aversion. Arrow (1965), for instance, argued that absolute risk aversion is decreasing in wealth. He also 
believed that individuals are less willing to subject a given percentage of wealth to risk, as their wealth increases, i.e., 
that relative risk aversion is increasing. But here we focus, so to speak, on the wealth-induced changes of the sign, 
rather than the magnitude, of the risk aversion coefficients.  
16 See the vNM utility function depicted in their famous Figure 3. However, justifying its shape is not trivial. Nathaniel 
Gregory (1980) postulates that wealth has two effects on utility: the usual direct effect, and a social rank effect, based 
on the comparison with the wealth of others, which will depend on the distribution of wealth in society. The shape of 
Friedman and Savage’s Figure 3 is justified by the similarly motivated model of Arthur Robson (1992). 
17 In other words: the attraction to all small enough risks would imply, under differentiability, that u”(x) > 0 
everywhere, and, thus, that u is a convex function.     16
of the great divide between preferences that satisfy the expected utility hypothesis and those that 
do not. 
But, as emphasized by Machina (1982), there is a second great divide for both normative 
and positive analysis, namely between preferences that are well defined on the choice space, and 
reference-dependent preferences, which require a different map of indifference curves for each 
reference point (see Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre, 2003, for a discussion). We argue next that 
amount-dependent attitudes are on the near side of this second divide.  
Let the probability of the gain be p = 0.8 and let our consumer display risk attraction for z 
= 100, but risk aversion for z = 200, both when her initial wealth is 1000 and when her initial 
wealth is 920. Choosing the risky gain of 100 when her wealth is 1000 means that she chooses the 
random variable , that gives a money balance of 1000 with probability 0.2 and a balance of 1100 
with probability 0.8, to the degenerate random variable  , that gives the certain balance of 1080. 
Note that the two random variables have the same expectation of 1080, and that  second-order 
stochastically dominates (SOSD) . Thus, the consumer’s choice shows attraction to a pure risk, 





  On the other hand, by choosing the certain gain of 160 over the 0.8 chance to gain 200 
when her wealth is 920, she chooses  over the random variable , that gives a money balance 
of 1120 with probability 0.8 and of 920 with probability 0.2. Again, E = E  = E  = 1080, 
and  SOSD   SOSD . Thus, she is attracted to the relatively small pure risk of , but averse 











  Figure 3 illustrates a conceivable map of indifference curves for amount-dependent 
attitudes: parallel lines of slope – 1/4 are fair-odds lines (or iso-expected money balances) for the 
probabilities (1- p,  p ) = (0.2, 0.8), where (1- p) is the probability of the state that corresponds to 
the horizontal axis.  Consider points C, S and L, which correspond to the random variables ,   
and  , respectively.  Relative to C, points in the segment (S, C) are small pure risks, preferred to 
C, whereas those northwest of B on the fair-odds line are large pure risks, dispreferred to C. The 
risk at the borderline point B makes the consumer indifferent between taking and not taking it. By 




Figure 3, while displaying amount-dependent attitudes, does not display wealth-dependent 
risk attitudes. Indeed, all the points B, B’, B” … are on a 45
0 line, at the same distance from the   17
certainty line along their fair-odds line.
18 This special case reflects the idea that the largest 
acceptable pure risk does not change with wealth.  
Our next three figures depict preferences that combine wealth-dependent attitudes with 
amount-dependent attitudes.  Figure 4 corresponds to the Type III preferences of Section 5: the 
person is always attracted to small enough risks, and averse to large ones, but the borderline 
between “large” and “small” increases with wealth: there are net risks that are too large to be taken 
at low wealth levels, but small enough to be taken at high wealth levels. This may reflect the fact 
that the risk of losing $ 100 is a big risk when you are poor, but a small one when you are wealthy.  
Figure 5 corresponds to Type IV of Section 5: the maximal acceptable risk now decreases 
with wealth. You are more inclined to play it unsafe when poor than when rich. In principle, the 
relationship between the maximal acceptable risk and wealth may be non-monotonic. Perhaps at 
low levels of wealth it decreases with wealth, but it increases with wealth when wealth is high, as 
illustrated in Figure 6. Or the pattern may conceivably be reversed.   
  Figures 3-7 illustrate the possibility of consistent, endowment-independent preferences for 
the amount-dependent attitudes case even though, as argued above, these preferences cannot be 
represented by a utility function of the expected utility form (1 – p) u(x1) + p u(x2).   
  An illustrative example of a utility function that does display risk attraction for 
small amounts of money at risk and risk aversion for large amounts can be constructed as 
follows.  
                                                 
18 If person with the preferences of Figure 3 and with nonrandom wealth faced actuarially favorable terms of trade, 
then she would risk the same amount at all levels of wealth. Her behavior would be then qualitatively similar to that of 
a risk-averse person with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). But, contrary to CARA preferences, those of Figure 
3 would yield risk-taking at actuarially fair terms. Parallel comments apply to Figures 3-7 below.    18
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where ρ
- < 0, ρ
+ > 0, and p (resp. 1- p) is the probability of the state where x2 (resp. x1) occurs. It 














 if p > 0 
(zero if p = 0).






 for a variety of values 
of ρ
- and ρ
+, and for several specifications of λ. Figure 7 displays the contour lines of U in the 
space of contingent money balances , for p = 0.5, ρ ) , ( 2 1 x x
- = - 0.5, ρ
+ = 0.5 and λ(p) = 1.5 + p.  
  This example reproduces the qualitative features of Figure 4, i.e., the maximal acceptable 
risk increases with wealth. 
 
 
9. Relation to the literature 
                                                 
19 When the partial derivatives are defined.  Clearly, U is homogeneous of degree one in (x1, x2) and differentiable 







= .    19
Experimental work has always shown interest in socio-demographic characteristics of subjects, 
like sex or age, and many experiments deal with other non-demographic or cultural effects on 
behaviour.
20 All this has influenced the experimental research on risk attitudes, resulting in 
experiments that relate risk-taking to age (Harbaugh, Krause and Vesterlund, 2002), to sex (Renate 
Schubert, Martin Brown, Matthias Gysler and Hans Brachinger, 1999, Catherine Eckel and Philip 
Grossman, forthcoming), and to non-demographic factors, like the effects of the experimental 
medium (i.e., the lab or the internet, see Tal Shavit, Doron Sonsino and Uri Benzion, 2001), or the 
frequency of evaluation (Uri Gneezy and Jan Potters, 1997).
21  Yet, surprisingly, economists have 
not shown much interest in the effect of differences in personal or family wealth on experimental 
behaviour.
22 This is particularly odd -even considering the difficulty of finding the relevant 
information- concerning, as it does, economists, and the oversight is even more striking when it 
refers to the study of risk aversion, because of the long-standing awareness that risk aversion may 
vary with wealth and that this relation “is of the greatest importance for prediction of economic 
reactions in the presence of uncertainty” (Kenneth Arrow, 1965). But the fact is that differences in 
personal wealth among subjects from the same culture do not appear to have ever been controlled 
in the lab, or used as a treatment to explain behaviour.
23
Field studies by development economists and anthropologist provide some information on 
whether wealthy people are more or less likely to exhibit attraction to money risks.
24 Frank 
Cancian (1972) reports on a variety of studies, including his own in an area of Chiapas, that relate 
the degree of risk taking (measured by an index of the speed or depth in the adoption of various 
innovations in the production or marketing of corn) to the person’s position in a four-tier wealth 
                                                 
20 From Alvin E. Roth, Vesna Prasnikar, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Shmuel Zamir (1991) to Joseph Henrich, 
Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herber Gintis and Richard McElreath (2001). 
21 There is also a growing field of evidence about risk attitudes from natural experiments, mostly television games or 
racetrack betting. See, e.g., Roel Beetsma and Peter Schotman (2001), Bruno Jullien and Bernard Salanié (2000), and 
the references mentioned there. 
22 There is a variety of experiments that link so-called wealth with different behaviour. But what is called wealth in 
these experiments is not what we mean here. It is either the endowed income provided by the experimenter as, for 
instance, in Olivier Armentier (2001), or the accumulated earnings of subjects as they keep participating in an 
experiment, as in Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992). Charles Holt and Susan Laury (2003), p. 11, report, almost as an 
afterthought, that “income seems to have a mildly negative effect on risk aversion”. But, as will be described below, 
anthropologists and development economists do appear to be interested in the effect of wealth on risk behaviour. 
23 However, there is a literature of experiments in the field that uses wealth and wealth differences as parametric 
factors for explaining cooperative behaviour. See, e.g., Juan-Camilo Cárdenas (1999) and the references he provides 
24 Here we focus on money, rather than lifestyle, risks. The conventional wisdom is that a low income tends to increase 
lifestyle risky behaviour, such as smoking, unprotected sex or excessive drinking, in particular for those behaviours 
that do not require purchases, such as seat-belt use. See Thomas Dee and William Evans (2001) and Phillip Levine 
(2001).   20
classification: low, low middle, high middle and high. The main observation is that the relation is 
increasing except for the middle-high group, i.e., low and middle high take fewer risks that middle 
low, which in turn take fewer risks than high. The findings do not directly address the issue of risk 
attraction, but suggest that it is more likely to be found in the low-middle and the high groups than 
in the low or high middle.  
John Dillon and Pasquale Scandizzo (1978) studied the risk attitudes of two groups of 
subsistence farmers in the Brazilian Sertão, namely small owners and shareholders. The two 
groups showed different socioeconomic characteristics: in particular, small owners were wealthier, 
with an average income which was 140% that of the sharecroppers. Their risk attitudes were 
elicited by two sets of hypothetical questions, one of which involved a potential fall below 
subsistence. Even though risk aversion was more common in either group, a non-negligible 
fraction displayed risk attraction, and this fraction was substantially higher for the (relatively) poor 
shareholders than for the small owners. These observations agree with the conclusion of Hans 
Binswanger’s (1980) study in rural India that tenant farmers are more risk attracted than 
landowners. 
Lawrence Kuznar (2001) adopts a similar method in his study of Andean pastoralists, and 
the questions are targeted to elicit the probability premium for given lotteries involving 
hypothetical herds of goats, sheep or cows. (The probability premium is the excess of winning 
probability over fair odds that makes the individual indifferent between a certain amount and a 
symmetric lottery centred in that amount: it is an index of risk aversion, with negative values 
corresponding to risk attraction). He finds that these premia are lowest for the poorest herders 
(with one instance of risk attraction), highest for herders with mean wealth, and relatively low for 
the wealthiest herders.   
Joseph Henrich and Richard McElreath (in press) report on several  experiments, with real 
payoffs, involving four groups of subjects: they find widespread risk attraction. A first experiment, 
involving Huinca and Mapuche subjects in Southern Chile, elicits the certainty equivalent of a 
fifty-fifty lottery of 2000 pesos (about $30) or nothing. A whopping 80% of the Mapuche show 
certainty equivalents above the expected value of 1000 pesos, evidencing risk attraction, whereas 
among the Huinca only 16% display risk attraction. It is interesting to note that the more risk 
loving Mapuches are considered (both by Mapuche and by Huincas) to be poorer and of lower 
social status.   21
They also perform an experiment with three groups of subjects: Mapuche, Sangu 
(Tanzanian agro-pastoralists) and UCLA undergraduates. They make binary choices between a 
certain gain of (the equivalent to) $15 and various actuarially fair lotteries of increasing variance. 
In all three groups, the lottery is preferred by more than 70% of the subjects when the odds of 
winning are 50% (i.e., the lottery gives $30 with probability 50%), evidencing pervasive risk 
attraction. When the lottery becomes riskier (say, 20% chance of winning $75, or 5% chance of 
winning $300), then only 20% of the UCLA undergraduates take the risk, versus at least 65% for 
the Mapuche and the Sengu. Thus, strong risk attraction seems to be more prevalent among 
Mapuche and Sangu than among the comparatively better-off UCLA undergraduates.  
   Finally, empirical work on risk based on surveys taken in developed countries seems to 
indicate that some socio-economic variables, like earnings, age, sex, employment experience and 
wealth, have a bearing on risk attitudes, but that these variables can only explain a small amount 
of the variability in attitudes towards risks, reflecting genuine differences in tastes (see Guiso and 
Paiella, 2001).
25 In particular, there seems to be limited empirical evidence of the sign of the 
relationship between risk attitudes and wealth.
26 This enhances the need for further experiments. 
 
10. Conclusions 
A fraction of our subjects display risk aversion for all amounts of money at risk, but many do not, 
displaying risk attraction for small amounts of money, and risk aversion for higher amounts. We 
compare the likelihood of displaying risk attraction for various amounts of money between the 
Wealthy and Nonwealthy groups.  
The novel finding in our experiment is the higher frequency of risk attraction for large 
amounts of money at risk in the Nonwealthy groups than in the Wealthy group: Nonwealthy 
subjects at the higher end of the risk-attraction scale (relative to their fellow Nonwealthy) risk 
higher amounts, in absolute value and thus, a fortiori, as a fraction of their wealth, than the 
corresponding risk--attracted Wealthy.  On the other hand, and not surprisingly, the Nonwealthy 
are more likely to display risk aversion for small amounts of money at stake, in agreement with 
                                                 
25 Willem Saris, in a personal communication, confirms the heterogeneity of risk attitudes observed in a national 
household survey conducted in Holland for a private investment company. Unfortunately the study that resulted from 
this survey is private information and cannot be quoted. See also Robert Barsky, F. Thomas Juster, Miles Kimball and 
Matthew Shapiro (1997) who confirm the heterogeneity of risk preferences. 
26 Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) find a parabolic relation between relative risk aversion and wealth, whereas 
Donkers et al. (2001) a negative relation between income and risk aversion.   22
the intuition that a given amount of dollars may be seen as “small” by a wealthy person, yet large 
by a poor one. 
We view our work as a first exploration of an important issue. From the empirical 
viewpoint, because our (statistically significant) result is admittedly based on only a few 
observations, its robustness should be tested by further experiments with larger samples. 
Conceptually, our findings that Wealthy subjects take, as a group, more risks when the stakes are 
low, but fewer when high, suggest a complex relationship between wealth and risk attitudes 
towards money that invites further analysis.  
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Amounts of Money 
 
         500       1000       2000      5000       7500      10000       15000 
Subject AN  Y y y y  y  y  y 
Subject BN  y y Y y  y  y  y 
Subject CN  Y y y y  y  y  y 
Subject DN  y Y y y  y  y  y 
Subject EN  y y y y  y  y  Y 
Subject FN  y y Y y  y  y  y 
Subject GN  y y Y y  y  y  y 
Subject HN  y y y y  y  Y  y 
Subject IN  N y y y  y  y  y 
Subject JN  n y y y  y  n,Y  y 
Subject KN  n y y y  Y  y  y 
Subject LN  n Y y y  y  y  y 
Subject MN  n n y y  y  y  Y 
Subject NN  n n y Y  y  y  y 
Subject ON  n n y Y  y  y  y 
Subject PN  n n n N  y  y  y 
Subject QN  n n n n  N  y  y 
Subject RN  n n n n  n  n  N 
Subject SN  y y y n  N  y  n 
Subject TN  y Y y Y  n  n  n 
Subject UN  n n y y  n  Y  n 
 
Table A1. Nonwealthy group. A letter y indicates insuring (thus displaying risk aversion), 
while a letter n indicates no insuring (thus displaying risk attraction). Capitals indicate the 
actual decision implemented. Subject JN changed his mind from no insuring to insuring 
when was confronted with the real choice. In this table, as in a similar table below, 




Amount of Money 
 
  500  1000 2000  5000 7500 10000  15000 
Subject AW  y  y y  y y y Y 
Subject BW  Y  y y  y y y y 
Subject CW  y  y Y  y y y y 
Subject DW  n  y y  y y Y y 
Subject EW  n  y Y  y y y y 
Subject FW  n  y Y  y y y y 
Subject GW  n  y y  Y y y y 
Subject HW  n  y y  y y y Y 
Subject IW  n  y y  Y y y y 
Subject JW  n  n y  y Y y y 
Subject KW  n  n y  y y Y y 
Subject LW  n  n y  y y y Y 
Subject MW  n  n y  y Y y y 
Subject NW  n  n n  y Y y y 
Subject OW  n  N  n  y y y y 
Subject PW  n  N  n  n y y y 
Subject QW  n n  n n  y  Y  y 
Subject RW  n  n n  N n n y 
Subject SW  N  y y  y y y n 
Subject TW  N  n y  n y y y 
Subject UW  n  N  n  n y y n 
 
 
Table A2. Wealthy group. A letter y indicates insuring (thus displaying risk aversion), 
while a letter n indicates no insuring (thus displaying risk attraction). Capitals indicate the 
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Figure 2.  Functional relations between the amount of money at risk and the probability of 
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Consistent indifference curves for amount-dependent attitudes  
in the space of contingent balances. 










Consistent indifference curves for amount-dependent attitudes 
 in the space of contingent balances. 
















































Consistent indifference curves amount-dependent attitudes 
 in the space of contingent balances. 
Maximal acceptable risk decreases with wealth. 
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  Figure 6. 
Consistent indifference curves for amount-dependent attitudes 
 in the space of contingent balances. 
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Figure 7 
   32
REFERENCES 
 
Armentier, Olivier (2001), “Does wealth affect fairness considerations?,” mimeo, SUNY at Stony 
Brook. 
 
Arrow, Kenneth (1965) Aspects of the Theory of Risk Bearing, Yrjo Jahnsson Lectures, The 
Academic Bookstore, Helsinki. 
 
Arrow, Kenneth (1970) Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing, Amsterdam: North Holland.  
 
Barsky, Robert B., F. Thomas Juster, Miles S. Kimball and Matthew Shapiro (1997) “Preference 
parameters and behavioral heterogeneity: An experimental approach in the health and retirement 
study,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 537-79. 
 
Beetsma, Roel, and Peter Schotman (2001) “Measuring risk attitudes in a natural experiment: Data 
from the television game show Lingo,” Economic Journal, 111, 821-848. 
Binswanger, Hans (1980) “Attitudes toward risk: Experimental measurement in rural India,” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 62, 395-407. 
Bosch-Domènech, Antoni, and Joaquim Silvestre (1999) “Does risk aversion or attraction depend 
on income? An experiment,” Economics Letters 65, 265-273. 
 
Bosch-Domènech, Antoni, and Joaquim Silvestre (2003) “Reflections on gains and losses: Three 
experiments,” mimeo. 
Cancian, Frank (1972) Change and Uncertainty in a Peasant Economy: The Maya Corn Farmers 
of Zinacantan, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo (1999), “Real wealth and experimental cooperation: Evidence from field 
experiments,” mimeo, Indiana University.   33
Cohen, Michele, Jean-Yves Jaffray and Tanios Said (1985), “Individual behavior under risk and 
under uncertainty: An experimental study,” Theory and Decision 18, 203-228. 
Dee, Thomas S., and William N. Evans (2001) “Teens and traffic safety,” in Gruber (2001). 
Dillon, John L., and Pasquale L. Scandizzo (1978) “Risk attitudes of subsistence farmers in 
Northeast Brazil: A sampling approach,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 60, 425
35.  
Donkers, Bas, Bertrand Melenberg and Arthur Van Hoest (2001) “Estimating risk attitudes using 
lotteries: A large sample approach,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 22 (2), 165-195. 
 
Eckel, Catherine and Philip J. Grossman, “Differences in the economic decisions of men and 
women: Experimental evidence,” forthcoming in Handbook Results in Experimental Economics, 
edited by Charles Plott and Vernon Smith, Elsevier, New York. 
 
Friedman, Milton, and Leonard J. Savage (1948) “The utility analysis of choices involving risk,” 
Journal of Political Economy 56 (4), 279 304. 
 
Gneezy, Uri, and Jan Potters (1997) “An experiment on risk taking and evaluation periods,” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 631-661. 
Gregory, Nathaniel (1980) “Relative wealth and risk taking: A short note on the Friedman-Savage 
utility function,” Journal of Political Economy 88(6), 1226-1230. 
Gruber, Jonathan, Editor (2001) Risky Behavior among Youths: An Economic Analysis, Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Guiso, Luigi and Monica Paiella (2001) “Risk aversion, wealth and background risk,” CEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 2728. 
 
Halek, Martin, and Joseph G. Eisenhauer (2001) “Demography of risk aversion,” Journal of Risk 
and Insurance 68 (1), 1-24.   34
 
Harbaugh, William T., Kate Krause and Lise Vesterlund (2002) “Risk attitudes of children and 
adults: choices over small and large probability gains and losses,” Experimental Economics 5, 53-
84.  
Henrich, Joseph, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herber Gintis and 
Richard McElreath (2001) “Cooperation, reciprocity and punishment in fifteen small-scale 
societies,” American Economic Review 91 (2), 73-78. 
Henrich, Joseph, and Richard McElreath (in press) “Are peasants risk-averse decision makers?” 
Current Anthropology. 
Hogarth, Robin M., and Hillel J. Einhorn (1990) “Venture theory: A model of decision weights,” 
Management Science 3 (7), 780-803. 
Holt, Charles A., and Susan K. Laury (2002) “Risk aversion and incentive effects,” American 
Economic Review 92, 5, 1644-1655. 
Jullien, Bruno, and Bernard Salanié (2000) “Estimating preferences under risk: The case of 
racetrack bettors,” Journal of Political Economy, 108 (3), 503-530. 
Kachelmeier, Steven J., and Mohamed Shehata (1992) “Examining risk preferences under high 
monetary incentives: Experimental evidence from the People’s Republic of China,” American 
Economic Review 82 (5), 1120-1141. 
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky (1979) “Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under 
risk,” Econometrica 47 (2), 263-291. 
Kuznar, Lawrence A. (2001) “Risk sensitivity and value among Andean pastoralists: Measures, 
models and empirical tests,” Current Anthropology 42 (3), 432-440.   
 
Levine, Phillip B. “The sexual activity and birth-control use of American teenagers,” in Gruber 
(2001).  
   35
Machina, Mark J. (1982) “ ‘Expected utility’ analysis without the independence axiom,” 
Econometrica 50 (2), 277-324.  
 
Pratt, John (1964) “Risk aversion in the small and the large,” Econometrica 32, 122-136. 
 
Preston, Malcolm G. and Philip Baratta (1948), “An experimental study of the auction value of an 
uncertain outcome,” American Journal of Psychology 61, 183-193. 
 
Robson, Arthur J. (1992) “Status, the distribution of wealth, private and social attitudes to risk,” 
Econometrica 60 (4), 837-857. 
Roth, Alvin E., Vesna Prasnikar, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Shmuel Zamir (1991) 
“Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: An experimental 
study,” American Economic Review 81, 1068-1095. 
Schubert, Renate, Martin Brown, Matthias Gysler and Hans W. Brachinger (1999) “Financial 
decision making: Are women more risk averse?” American Economic Review 89 (2), 381-385. 
Shavit, Tal, Doron Sonsino and Uri Benzion (2001) “A comparative study of lotteries-Evaluation 
in class and on the web,” Journal of Economic Psychology 22 (4), 483-491.  
Starmer, Chris, and Robert Sugden (1991) “Does a random lottery incentive system elicit true 
preferences? An experimental investigation,” American Economic Review 81 (4), 971-978. 
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman (1992) “Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative 
representation of uncertainty,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5, 297-323. 
 
 